Top 10 Cases Decided by Baroness Hale
Share
Baroness Brenda Hale (born 1945) is one of the most influential British judges of the modern era and the first woman to serve as President of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. She made significant contributions to family law, human rights, constitutional law, equality and medical law. Her judgments are particularly recognised for their emphasis on individual rights, children's welfare, gender equality and the rule of law. She served as President of the Supreme Court from 2017 to 2020.
We have selected 10 of her most important and influential cases, illustrating the breadth of her judicial contribution and the development of English law.
1. Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17
Mr Stack and Ms Dowden lived together for approximately 19 years and had four children. They purchased a property in their joint names but made unequal financial contributions towards its acquisition and maintenance. Following their separation, a dispute arose over the division of the beneficial interests in the property. Mr Stack argued that the proceeds should be divided equally, while Ms Dowden maintained that she was entitled to a larger share.
Baroness Hale delivered the leading judgment and held that where a property is purchased in joint names, the starting point is that the beneficial ownership reflects the legal ownership. However, this presumption can be rebutted by evidence demonstrating a different common intention. The court must consider the whole course of conduct between the parties, including their financial arrangements and the circumstances surrounding the acquisition of the property.
The case became a landmark authority on constructive trusts and the beneficial ownership of family homes. It established important principles for determining the respective shares of unmarried cohabiting couples where a property is held in joint names without an express declaration of trust.
2. Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53
Ms Jones and Mr Kernott lived together for several years and purchased a property in their joint names. Following their separation, Ms Jones continued living in the property with their children and assumed responsibility for the mortgage and household expenses. Mr Kernott subsequently purchased another property for himself. When the parties later disputed their respective beneficial interests in the original property, the court had to determine how the proceeds should be divided.
Baroness Hale, delivering a joint judgment with Lord Walker, held that the parties' common intention concerning beneficial ownership could change over time. Where their actual intentions could not be inferred from their conduct, the court could impute an intention as to the proportions in which they intended to share the property, provided that a common intention to share ownership had been established.
The case developed the principles established in Stack v Dowden and clarified how courts should determine beneficial ownership where the parties' intentions have changed during their relationship. It remains a leading authority on common intention constructive trusts and the division of property between unmarried cohabiting couples.
3. Yemshaw v London Borough of Hounslow [2011] UKSC 3
Ms Yemshaw left her matrimonial home with her children because she was experiencing threatening and intimidating behaviour from her husband. She subsequently applied to Hounslow London Borough Council for housing assistance as a person who was homeless as a result of domestic violence. The council initially refused to accept that she was homeless because she had not experienced physical violence.
Baroness Hale delivered the leading judgment and held that domestic violence should not be restricted to physical violence. The concept could include threatening, intimidating and other forms of abuse that might give rise to a risk of harm. She emphasised that the statutory meaning of violence had to be interpreted in light of contemporary understanding of domestic abuse and its effects on victims.
The case significantly developed the legal understanding of domestic violence in housing law. It established that victims of non-physical abuse could fall within the statutory protection available to people who were homeless as a result of domestic violence.
4. In re G (Children) [2006] UKHL 43
The case concerned two children whose biological mother had previously been in a same-sex relationship with another woman, who had played an important parental role in their lives. Following the breakdown of the relationship, a dispute arose over the children's living arrangements. The former partner sought a shared residence order, while the biological mother opposed the application and subsequently moved the children to Cornwall without informing the other woman.
Baroness Hale delivered the leading judgment and emphasised that the welfare of the children was the paramount consideration under the Children Act 1989. She recognised that the biological relationship between a parent and child could be relevant to determining the child's welfare, but it did not create an automatic right to custody or determine the outcome of the proceedings.
The case is an important authority on the welfare principle in family law. It recognised the significance of psychological parenting and the need to consider the relationships that contribute to a child's emotional and family life, including relationships with same-sex parents.
5. In re B (Children) [2008] UKHL 35
The case concerned care proceedings brought by a local authority under the Children Act 1989. The central issue was the standard of proof that courts should apply when determining whether a child had suffered, or was likely to suffer, significant harm. There was uncertainty over whether the seriousness of the allegations and the consequences of a care order justified applying a higher standard of proof than the ordinary civil standard.
Baroness Hale delivered the leading judgment and held that the applicable standard of proof was the balance of probabilities. The court had to determine whether the relevant facts were more likely than not to have occurred. She rejected the suggestion that the standard of proof should become more demanding simply because the allegations were serious or the consequences of the proceedings were significant.
The case confirmed that the civil standard of proof applies in care proceedings under the Children Act 1989. It remains an important authority on evidence and the standard of proof in family law, particularly where courts must determine whether children are at risk of significant harm.
6. ZH (Tanzania) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 4
The case concerned a Tanzanian mother who had lived in the United Kingdom with her two children, both of whom were British citizens. The Home Secretary sought to deport her because of her immigration history. The children would effectively have had to leave the United Kingdom with their mother, despite having the right to remain in the country as British citizens.
Baroness Hale delivered the leading judgment and held that the best interests of the children must be treated as a primary consideration when determining immigration decisions affecting them. Although their interests could be outweighed by other considerations, such as the maintenance of effective immigration control, they had to be considered first. She also emphasised that children should not be disadvantaged because of circumstances for which they were not responsible, including their parents' immigration history.
The case became a landmark authority on children's rights and immigration law. It established important principles concerning the assessment of children's best interests under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and the relevance of British citizenship in immigration decisions.
7. Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11
Mrs Montgomery was a diabetic woman of small stature who was pregnant with her first child. Her obstetrician was aware that diabetic mothers faced an increased risk of shoulder dystocia during vaginal delivery, a complication in which the baby's shoulders become stuck after delivery of the head. However, she was not informed of the risk or given the opportunity to consider an elective caesarean section. During delivery, her baby suffered shoulder dystocia and sustained serious injuries.
The Supreme Court held that doctors have a duty to take reasonable care to ensure that patients are aware of material risks associated with recommended treatment and of reasonable alternative treatments. A risk is material if a reasonable person in the patient's position would likely attach significance to it, or if the doctor is or should reasonably be aware that the particular patient would attach significance to it.
The case transformed the law on medical consent and patient autonomy. It rejected the traditional approach that gave doctors substantial control over deciding which risks should be disclosed and established the importance of patients making informed decisions about their medical treatment.
8. R (Tigere) v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills [2015] UKSC 57
Ms Tigere arrived in the United Kingdom from Zambia when she was six years old. She had lived in the country for most of her life and had been granted discretionary leave to remain. However, she was not eligible for settled status and was therefore excluded from receiving a student loan under the government's eligibility rules. She challenged the policy, arguing that it unfairly prevented her from accessing higher education because of her immigration status.
Baroness Hale delivered a leading judgment in the Supreme Court, which allowed the appeal by a majority. The Court considered the relationship between the student finance eligibility rules and the right to education under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights, read together with Article 14. It concluded that the blanket exclusion of people in Ms Tigere's position was disproportionate and unjustified.
The case is an important authority on discrimination, education and human rights. It demonstrates that government eligibility policies must strike a proportionate balance between legitimate public objectives and the rights of individuals, particularly where strict immigration-status requirements exclude people who have substantial connections with the United Kingdom.
9. Sharland v Sharland [2015] UKSC 60
Mr and Mrs Sharland were involved in financial proceedings following the breakdown of their marriage. Their principal financial dispute concerned the value of Mr Sharland's substantial shareholding in a software company. During the proceedings, Mr Sharland provided information suggesting that there were no immediate plans for the company to be floated on the stock market. However, it subsequently emerged that preparations for an initial public offering were considerably more advanced than he had disclosed. Mrs Sharland argued that the financial settlement had been obtained through fraudulent non-disclosure.
Baroness Hale delivered the unanimous judgment and held that fraud could justify setting aside a financial order made following a divorce settlement. Where a party had deliberately concealed material financial information, the court could not simply assume that the original order should remain in place. The question was whether the fraud was material to the decision made by the court.
The case established an important principle concerning fraudulent non-disclosure in matrimonial financial proceedings. It confirmed that parties must provide full and frank financial disclosure and that a settlement obtained through material fraud may be set aside, protecting the integrity of the family justice system.
10. R (Miller) v The Prime Minister; Cherry v Advocate General for Scotland [2019] UKSC 41
In 2019, Prime Minister Boris Johnson advised the Queen to prorogue Parliament for approximately five weeks during a critical period in the Brexit process. The decision attracted considerable controversy because it prevented Parliament from sitting for a significant period while the United Kingdom was approaching its scheduled departure from the European Union. Gina Miller and other claimants challenged the legality of the government's decision.
Baroness Hale and Lord Reed delivered the unanimous judgment of the Supreme Court. The Court held that the advice to prorogue Parliament was justiciable and unlawful because it had the effect of frustrating or preventing Parliament from carrying out its constitutional functions without reasonable justification. Consequently, the prorogation was null and of no effect, meaning that Parliament had not been lawfully prorogued.
The case became one of the most significant constitutional decisions in modern British history. It reaffirmed the constitutional principles of parliamentary sovereignty and parliamentary accountability, demonstrating that the exercise of prerogative powers by the executive is subject to legal limits and judicial scrutiny.














