Calveley v Chief Constable of Merseyside Police [1989]
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In Calveley v Chief Constable of Merseyside Police [1989] 1 AC 1228, along with related cases Worrall v Chief Constable of Merseyside and Park v Chief Constable of Merseyside, the House of Lords dealt with situations involving police officers employed by Merseyside Police. These officers faced complaints from the public, leading to disciplinary proceedings that lasted nearly three years, with some officers unaware of the complaints for a significant portion of that time.
Ultimately, one officer was not prosecuted, another was acquitted, and a third was initially dismissed but had the dismissal overturned due to prejudice resulting from the delay in proceedings. The officers claimed negligence and breach of duties under the Police (Discipline) Regulations 1977, seeking damages for economic and psychiatric harm suffered during this period.
The House of Lords ruled in favour of the defendant, stating that no action existed for breach of statutory duty under the Police (Discipline) Regulations 1977. The purpose of this duty was to protect officers from prejudice, not to shield them from economic or psychiatric harm. The proper recourse for cases involving prejudice due to delay was deemed to be judicial review of the decision to continue proceedings.
Additionally, the House of Lords determined that the police do not owe a common law duty of care in negligence to suspects that necessitates conducting investigations in a timely or reasonable manner. Two main reasons supported this decision: first, economic and psychiatric losses were not foreseeable outcomes of negligently handled criminal investigations; second, imposing such a duty would contradict public policy by potentially hindering police action and efficiency, as the threat of negligence action could impede fearless and efficient police work.
This ruling established that the Police (Discipline) Regulations 1977 did not provide grounds for a statutory duty breach action and that there was no common law duty of care owed by the police in negligence to suspects requiring timely or reasonable investigations.
Ultimately, one officer was not prosecuted, another was acquitted, and a third was initially dismissed but had the dismissal overturned due to prejudice resulting from the delay in proceedings. The officers claimed negligence and breach of duties under the Police (Discipline) Regulations 1977, seeking damages for economic and psychiatric harm suffered during this period.
The House of Lords ruled in favour of the defendant, stating that no action existed for breach of statutory duty under the Police (Discipline) Regulations 1977. The purpose of this duty was to protect officers from prejudice, not to shield them from economic or psychiatric harm. The proper recourse for cases involving prejudice due to delay was deemed to be judicial review of the decision to continue proceedings.
Additionally, the House of Lords determined that the police do not owe a common law duty of care in negligence to suspects that necessitates conducting investigations in a timely or reasonable manner. Two main reasons supported this decision: first, economic and psychiatric losses were not foreseeable outcomes of negligently handled criminal investigations; second, imposing such a duty would contradict public policy by potentially hindering police action and efficiency, as the threat of negligence action could impede fearless and efficient police work.
This ruling established that the Police (Discipline) Regulations 1977 did not provide grounds for a statutory duty breach action and that there was no common law duty of care owed by the police in negligence to suspects requiring timely or reasonable investigations.
