Coventry v Lawrence [2014]

Coventry v Lawrence [2014] UKSC 13 addressed significant issues in the law of private nuisance, including the role of planning permission, the assessment of locality, and the appropriateness of remedies such as injunctions and damages. This case remains a landmark authority on balancing property rights with broader community interests.

The dispute arose from noise generated by activities at a stadium and motocross track in the Suffolk countryside. Planning permission for the stadium was granted in 1975, allowing for speedway racing and associated activities. The motocross track received similar permissions. In 2006, the claimants, Katherine Lawrence and Raymond Shields, purchased a nearby property, Fenland, and later filed a claim for nuisance due to excessive noise.

At trial, the court found in favour of the claimants, granting an injunction to restrict noise emissions. However, the Court of Appeal reversed this decision, holding that the claimants had failed to prove nuisance. It also considered the defendants’ planning permission as an important factor in determining the character of the locality.

The Supreme Court unanimously allowed the appeal, restoring the trial court’s judgment. Lord Neuberger delivered the leading opinion, with the other justices concurring. The court held that the respondents’ activities constituted a nuisance and rejected their arguments based on planning permission and prescriptive rights.

1. Nuisance and Prescriptive Rights
The respondents argued that they had acquired a prescriptive right to generate noise through long-standing activities. The Supreme Court rejected this, clarifying that such a right requires uninterrupted nuisance for over 20 years. The court found that this threshold had not been met, as the respondents had failed to establish continuous nuisance for the requisite period.

2. Coming to the Nuisance
The court dismissed the argument that the claimants’ purchase of Fenland after the noisy activities began precluded their nuisance claim. Lord Neuberger emphasised that a claimant’s right to peaceful enjoyment of their property is not diminished by moving into an area affected by nuisance. However, he acknowledged that a change in the claimant’s use of land might, in some circumstances, affect a nuisance claim.

3. Character of the Locality
The respondents contended that their activities formed part of the character of the locality and should therefore be taken into account when assessing nuisance. The Supreme Court accepted this principle but limited its application. Activities contributing to the character of the locality can only be considered if they do not themselves constitute a nuisance. The court found that the noise levels exceeded acceptable limits, making the activities unreasonable despite their longstanding presence.

4. Planning Permission
The court ruled that planning permission cannot authorise a nuisance. While planning permission may influence the character of a locality, it does not extinguish private property rights. Lord Neuberger stressed that a planning authority cannot deprive a property owner of the right to object to nuisance without providing compensation. Nonetheless, the terms of planning permission may provide guidance in assessing what constitutes reasonable noise levels.

5. Remedies: Injunction or Damages
The trial court had granted an injunction to limit noise emissions, but the Court of Appeal criticised this remedy, favouring damages instead. The Supreme Court reinstated the injunction as the prima facie remedy for nuisance, noting that the burden lies on the defendant to demonstrate why damages should be awarded in lieu of an injunction. The court acknowledged, however, that in some cases, damages might be appropriate if an injunction disproportionately impacts the defendant’s lawful activities.

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Coventry v Lawrence reaffirmed fundamental principles of nuisance law while addressing contemporary issues, such as the role of planning permission and the balance between property rights and public interests. The case underscores the importance of protecting individuals from unreasonable interference while recognising the need for flexibility in awarding remedies. This decision remains a key authority in private nuisance claims and the broader context of property law.