Gibbons v Proctor [1891]
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Gibbons v Proctor [1891] 64 LT 594 (also reported as Gibson v Proctor 55 JP 616) is an English contract law case that deals with the concept of offers made through advertisements and the acceptance of such offers by individuals who were initially unaware of the offer.
The police issued an advertisement stating that they would provide a reward for information leading to the arrest of a criminal. The condition specified in the advertisement was that the information must be given to the Superintendent. A police officer, unaware of the offer at the time, asked a colleague to forward useful information to the Superintendent. Before the information reached the Superintendent, the police officer became aware of the reward offer.
The court held that advertisements offering rewards for information leading to the arrest or conviction of a criminal should be treated as offers. The intention to be bound is inferred from the fact that such advertisements do not anticipate further negotiations or bargaining.
It's important to note that this case is sometimes incorrectly cited as authority for the proposition that acceptance in ignorance of an offer is effective. However, a more accurate authority for this proposition is the Australian case of R v Clarke [1927]. In Gibbons v Proctor, the party claiming the reward had full knowledge of the offer by the time the offer was accepted. In cases like this, acceptance is considered effective only when the prescribed action (such as providing information) reaches the offeror.
In summary, while the case is significant for establishing that reward advertisements are offers, it does not strongly support the idea that acceptance in ignorance of the offer is effective, especially when the accepting party gains knowledge of the offer before completing the prescribed action.
The police issued an advertisement stating that they would provide a reward for information leading to the arrest of a criminal. The condition specified in the advertisement was that the information must be given to the Superintendent. A police officer, unaware of the offer at the time, asked a colleague to forward useful information to the Superintendent. Before the information reached the Superintendent, the police officer became aware of the reward offer.
The court held that advertisements offering rewards for information leading to the arrest or conviction of a criminal should be treated as offers. The intention to be bound is inferred from the fact that such advertisements do not anticipate further negotiations or bargaining.
It's important to note that this case is sometimes incorrectly cited as authority for the proposition that acceptance in ignorance of an offer is effective. However, a more accurate authority for this proposition is the Australian case of R v Clarke [1927]. In Gibbons v Proctor, the party claiming the reward had full knowledge of the offer by the time the offer was accepted. In cases like this, acceptance is considered effective only when the prescribed action (such as providing information) reaches the offeror.
In summary, while the case is significant for establishing that reward advertisements are offers, it does not strongly support the idea that acceptance in ignorance of the offer is effective, especially when the accepting party gains knowledge of the offer before completing the prescribed action.
