Gore and Snell v Carpenter [1990]
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Gore and Snell v Carpenter [1990] 60 P & CR 456, ChD is an English land law case, establishing that no common intention to sever a joint tenancy could be inferred when parties held reservations that prevented a full agreement.
A husband and wife jointly owned two properties as joint tenants. Their marital relationship had broken down, leading them to decide on separation. During the process of separation, they reached an initial agreement in principle that their joint tenancy would terminate. The understanding was that each spouse would have one of the houses as part of an overarching separation agreement. However, a final agreement had not been reached when the husband tragically committed suicide. The main issue revolved around whether the initial agreement in principle to sever the joint tenancy was sufficient or if more concrete actions were required to effectuate the severance.
The court ruled that the joint tenancy had not been severed by the couple's agreement in principle. While a joint tenancy can be severed by mutual agreement or a course of conduct, as established in Williams v Hensman [1861], the court found that the agreement in principle was merely a preliminary form of agreement and could not be considered a definitive course of conduct.
The agreement in principle was part of a broader separation agreement that had not been finalised or signed by the couple, making it subject to potential revision. Despite being close to an agreement, the parties had not conclusively severed their joint tenancy. The court emphasised that severance must result from a clear agreement or a discernible course of conduct, and neither of these elements was present in this case.
As a result, the joint tenancy remained intact, and the wife retained the right of survivorship. The court concluded that since the joint tenancy was technically still in existence at the time of the husband's death, the wife was entitled to the benefits of the survivorship clause.
A husband and wife jointly owned two properties as joint tenants. Their marital relationship had broken down, leading them to decide on separation. During the process of separation, they reached an initial agreement in principle that their joint tenancy would terminate. The understanding was that each spouse would have one of the houses as part of an overarching separation agreement. However, a final agreement had not been reached when the husband tragically committed suicide. The main issue revolved around whether the initial agreement in principle to sever the joint tenancy was sufficient or if more concrete actions were required to effectuate the severance.
The court ruled that the joint tenancy had not been severed by the couple's agreement in principle. While a joint tenancy can be severed by mutual agreement or a course of conduct, as established in Williams v Hensman [1861], the court found that the agreement in principle was merely a preliminary form of agreement and could not be considered a definitive course of conduct.
The agreement in principle was part of a broader separation agreement that had not been finalised or signed by the couple, making it subject to potential revision. Despite being close to an agreement, the parties had not conclusively severed their joint tenancy. The court emphasised that severance must result from a clear agreement or a discernible course of conduct, and neither of these elements was present in this case.
As a result, the joint tenancy remained intact, and the wife retained the right of survivorship. The court concluded that since the joint tenancy was technically still in existence at the time of the husband's death, the wife was entitled to the benefits of the survivorship clause.
