McLoughlin v O'Brian [1983]
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McLoughlin v O'Brian [1983] 1 AC 410 is a landmark English tort law case decided by the House of Lords, addressing the recoverability of damages for psychiatric harm suffered due to an accident involving a claimant's family.
On 19 October 1973, the claimant, Mrs McLoughlin, was informed by a friend two hours after a serious accident that her husband and three children had been involved. She was driven to the hospital, where she learned that one of her children had died and saw her husband and two other children severely injured, covered in oil and mud. This experience caused Mrs McLoughlin to suffer severe nervous shock, including clinical depression and personality changes. She subsequently sued the defendant, who was responsible for the accident.
This case was unique at the time as it extended the possibility of recovering damages for psychiatric harm beyond the immediate scene of the accident and beyond the time of its occurrence. Historically, English courts had allowed claimants to recover damages for psychiatric injuries only when they were present at the scene and witnessed the peril of a loved one. The legal novelty of this case made it a frequent subject of analysis by law students and legal philosophers, including Ronald Dworkin, who explored it hypothetically in his book Law's Empire.
At trial, the judge ruled in favour of Mrs McLoughlin, finding that the defendants owed her a duty of care as her psychiatric injury was a foreseeable result of witnessing her family's traumatic condition in the hospital. However, the Court of Appeal overturned this decision, citing public policy concerns. While the Court acknowledged the foreseeability of her injury and the existence of a duty of care, it held that allowing recovery in this context would overly extend liability. Lord Justice Stephenson reasoned that the breach's consequences should be limited for policy reasons, while Lord Justice Griffiths argued that the defendants' duty of care should apply only to those directly affected at the accident scene. The Court of Appeal suggested that any extension of liability should be left to legislative action.
The House of Lords ultimately reversed the Court of Appeal's decision and ruled in favour of Mrs McLoughlin. Lord Wilberforce delivered the leading judgment, outlining a three-part test for recovering damages for psychiatric harm. First, there must be a close familial relationship between the claimant and the accident victim, excluding ordinary bystanders. Second, the claimant must be in close proximity to the accident in terms of time and place, which includes witnessing the immediate aftermath of the event. Third, the claimant's psychiatric harm must result from direct perception of the event or its immediate aftermath, whether through sight or hearing. Lord Wilberforce and Lord Scarman both referenced the influence of the American case Dillon v Legg [1968] in shaping their reasoning.
The judgment reaffirmed that foreseeability of psychiatric harm and a claimant's close connection to the incident could justify imposing liability, even in the absence of the claimant's physical presence at the accident scene. It also emphasised that public policy concerns should not obstruct justice for claimants who meet the established criteria. This decision significantly shaped the development of English tort law regarding claims for psychiatric harm, balancing the principles of foreseeability, proximity, and fairness.
On 19 October 1973, the claimant, Mrs McLoughlin, was informed by a friend two hours after a serious accident that her husband and three children had been involved. She was driven to the hospital, where she learned that one of her children had died and saw her husband and two other children severely injured, covered in oil and mud. This experience caused Mrs McLoughlin to suffer severe nervous shock, including clinical depression and personality changes. She subsequently sued the defendant, who was responsible for the accident.
This case was unique at the time as it extended the possibility of recovering damages for psychiatric harm beyond the immediate scene of the accident and beyond the time of its occurrence. Historically, English courts had allowed claimants to recover damages for psychiatric injuries only when they were present at the scene and witnessed the peril of a loved one. The legal novelty of this case made it a frequent subject of analysis by law students and legal philosophers, including Ronald Dworkin, who explored it hypothetically in his book Law's Empire.
At trial, the judge ruled in favour of Mrs McLoughlin, finding that the defendants owed her a duty of care as her psychiatric injury was a foreseeable result of witnessing her family's traumatic condition in the hospital. However, the Court of Appeal overturned this decision, citing public policy concerns. While the Court acknowledged the foreseeability of her injury and the existence of a duty of care, it held that allowing recovery in this context would overly extend liability. Lord Justice Stephenson reasoned that the breach's consequences should be limited for policy reasons, while Lord Justice Griffiths argued that the defendants' duty of care should apply only to those directly affected at the accident scene. The Court of Appeal suggested that any extension of liability should be left to legislative action.
The House of Lords ultimately reversed the Court of Appeal's decision and ruled in favour of Mrs McLoughlin. Lord Wilberforce delivered the leading judgment, outlining a three-part test for recovering damages for psychiatric harm. First, there must be a close familial relationship between the claimant and the accident victim, excluding ordinary bystanders. Second, the claimant must be in close proximity to the accident in terms of time and place, which includes witnessing the immediate aftermath of the event. Third, the claimant's psychiatric harm must result from direct perception of the event or its immediate aftermath, whether through sight or hearing. Lord Wilberforce and Lord Scarman both referenced the influence of the American case Dillon v Legg [1968] in shaping their reasoning.
The judgment reaffirmed that foreseeability of psychiatric harm and a claimant's close connection to the incident could justify imposing liability, even in the absence of the claimant's physical presence at the accident scene. It also emphasised that public policy concerns should not obstruct justice for claimants who meet the established criteria. This decision significantly shaped the development of English tort law regarding claims for psychiatric harm, balancing the principles of foreseeability, proximity, and fairness.
