Morice v Bishop of Durham [1805]
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Morice v Bishop of Durham [1805] EWHC Ch J80 is a significant English trusts law case that revolves around the beneficiary principle and the establishment of valid trusts. The factual background involves General Mordaunt Cracherode and his son Clayton Mordaunt Cracherode, a benefactor to the British Museum. Despite Clayton's substantial bequests to the museum, his homemade will left his sister Ann his land and residual fortune. However, after undue influence from Clayton's friend, Bishop Shute Barrington of Durham, Ann was persuaded to make a new will, granting the bishop sole executorship with wide discretionary powers over the funds.
The key legal point in the case was the provision in the will stating, "such objects of benevolence and liberality as the trustee in his own discretion shall most approve of." Sir William Grant, in the Court of Chancery, held that the will could not constitute a charity, leading the money to revert to the next of kin. Grant emphasised that a trust must be of such a nature that the court can exercise control, and if the objects are uncertain, the property remains undisposed of, benefiting those entitled to ownership by law.
On appeal to the High Court of Chancery, Lord Eldon LC concurred, stating that the trust could not be valid as a private trust due to the lack of identifiable beneficiaries. He underscored the maxim that the court must control the execution of a trust, necessitating its reviewability. Lord Eldon articulated that for a trust to be effective, the subject and objects must be ascertainable, and if maladministration occurred, the court should be able to reform and direct a due administration.
Lord Eldon also addressed the nature of the charitable purpose expressed in the will, highlighting that a charitable trust could endure despite general or indefinite expressions. However, he emphasised the importance of the subject and objects being ascertainable, asserting that the trust in question failed because its intention was too indefinite. Despite the testator's expression of a charitable purpose and delegation of execution to the court, the bishop's discretionary powers were deemed too broad and lacking the specificity required for effective control and management by the court.
In conclusion, this case contributes to the understanding of trust law by highlighting the necessity for ascertainable subjects and objects in a trust and the court's role in ensuring control and reviewability. The case underscores the delicate balance between the expression of charitable intentions and the legal requirements for a valid trust.
The key legal point in the case was the provision in the will stating, "such objects of benevolence and liberality as the trustee in his own discretion shall most approve of." Sir William Grant, in the Court of Chancery, held that the will could not constitute a charity, leading the money to revert to the next of kin. Grant emphasised that a trust must be of such a nature that the court can exercise control, and if the objects are uncertain, the property remains undisposed of, benefiting those entitled to ownership by law.
On appeal to the High Court of Chancery, Lord Eldon LC concurred, stating that the trust could not be valid as a private trust due to the lack of identifiable beneficiaries. He underscored the maxim that the court must control the execution of a trust, necessitating its reviewability. Lord Eldon articulated that for a trust to be effective, the subject and objects must be ascertainable, and if maladministration occurred, the court should be able to reform and direct a due administration.
Lord Eldon also addressed the nature of the charitable purpose expressed in the will, highlighting that a charitable trust could endure despite general or indefinite expressions. However, he emphasised the importance of the subject and objects being ascertainable, asserting that the trust in question failed because its intention was too indefinite. Despite the testator's expression of a charitable purpose and delegation of execution to the court, the bishop's discretionary powers were deemed too broad and lacking the specificity required for effective control and management by the court.
In conclusion, this case contributes to the understanding of trust law by highlighting the necessity for ascertainable subjects and objects in a trust and the court's role in ensuring control and reviewability. The case underscores the delicate balance between the expression of charitable intentions and the legal requirements for a valid trust.