Oxford v Moss [1979]
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Oxford v Moss [1979] 68 Cr App R 183 revolved around the theft of intangible property, specifically information. The High Court addressed whether information, such as a proof exam paper, could be considered intangible property and, consequently, be subject to theft under the Theft Act 1968.
The defendant, Moss, a university student, acquired a proof copy of an upcoming exam paper. While he intended to return the physical proof, he was charged with stealing information belonging to the University's Senate.
The prosecution argued that the information itself was a form of property, protected by a proprietary right of confidence. They contended that breaching this confidence amounted to stealing the information. Conversely, the defence asserted that Section 4 of the Theft Act 1968 did not encompass information as a type of intangible property.
The Liverpool Stipendiary Magistrate initially ruled that confidential information was not a form of property under Section 4 of the Theft Act 1968. The case was then referred to the High Court.
The High Court considered the definition of intangible property in Section 4(1) of the Theft Act. The judges noted that cases involving trade secrets and matrimonial secrets, while dealing with confidentiality, were primarily addressed through civil remedies such as injunctions or damages rather than criminal charges. The court concluded that the definition of intangible property did not encompass confidential information.
As a result, the prosecutor's appeal was dismissed, affirming that, according to the Theft Act 1968, confidential information did not fall within the scope of intangible property susceptible to theft.
The defendant, Moss, a university student, acquired a proof copy of an upcoming exam paper. While he intended to return the physical proof, he was charged with stealing information belonging to the University's Senate.
The prosecution argued that the information itself was a form of property, protected by a proprietary right of confidence. They contended that breaching this confidence amounted to stealing the information. Conversely, the defence asserted that Section 4 of the Theft Act 1968 did not encompass information as a type of intangible property.
The Liverpool Stipendiary Magistrate initially ruled that confidential information was not a form of property under Section 4 of the Theft Act 1968. The case was then referred to the High Court.
The High Court considered the definition of intangible property in Section 4(1) of the Theft Act. The judges noted that cases involving trade secrets and matrimonial secrets, while dealing with confidentiality, were primarily addressed through civil remedies such as injunctions or damages rather than criminal charges. The court concluded that the definition of intangible property did not encompass confidential information.
As a result, the prosecutor's appeal was dismissed, affirming that, according to the Theft Act 1968, confidential information did not fall within the scope of intangible property susceptible to theft.
