R (Buckinghamshire County Council) v Transport Secretary [2014] (High-Speed 2)
Share
R (Buckinghamshire County Council) v Transport Secretary (High-Speed 2) [2014] UKSC 3; [2014] 1 WLR 324 revolves around the legal challenge to the UK government's plans to construct a high-speed railway network, known as HS2, connecting London to Manchester and Leeds via Birmingham. The government's strategy and proposals were outlined in two command papers, with the second referred to as the DNS (Decisions and Next Steps).
The primary legal concern was whether the hybrid bill procedure, designed for the parliamentary approval of HS2's first phase, aligned with the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive 2011/92/EU. The claimants argued that this procedure, while resembling regular legislation, lacked sufficient public participation, contravening the EU directive.
Another issue centred on whether the DNS, by setting a framework influencing future project development consent, fell within the scope of the Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive 2001/42/EC. The claimants contended that a strategic environmental assessment should have been conducted, which did not happen.
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, ruling that the hybrid bill procedure was not incompatible with EU law. The court found that the participative elements of the procedure were adequate, rejecting the argument that party politics would undermine informed parliamentary consideration.
The court held that the DNS did not fall under the SEA Directive. It was characterised as influential rather than determinative in shaping Parliament's decision on the development. Lord Sumption emphasised that the DNS did not impose constraints on Parliament's ultimate decision-making.
The court tactically framed the case as an interpretation of EU legislation to sidestep potential conflicts with Article 9 of the Bill of Rights, which safeguards parliamentary proceedings from legal questioning. However, in obiter, Lords Neuberger and Mance explored the hypothetical scenario of a conflict between a fundamental statute, such as the Bill of Rights 1688, and the European Communities Act 1972 (ECA). They suggested it was certainly arguable that fundamental statutes exist in the UK constitution, indicating a potential hierarchy where the Bill of Rights may hold more significance than the ECA.
The concept of a hierarchy of constitutional statutes, although providing potential clarity post-Factortame ||, introduces complexities. The resolution of conflicts between fundamental statutes remains challenging, especially without a clear metric to measure fundamentality. This discussion has broader implications for the treatment of EU law within the UK constitutional framework.
The primary legal concern was whether the hybrid bill procedure, designed for the parliamentary approval of HS2's first phase, aligned with the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive 2011/92/EU. The claimants argued that this procedure, while resembling regular legislation, lacked sufficient public participation, contravening the EU directive.
Another issue centred on whether the DNS, by setting a framework influencing future project development consent, fell within the scope of the Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive 2001/42/EC. The claimants contended that a strategic environmental assessment should have been conducted, which did not happen.
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, ruling that the hybrid bill procedure was not incompatible with EU law. The court found that the participative elements of the procedure were adequate, rejecting the argument that party politics would undermine informed parliamentary consideration.
The court held that the DNS did not fall under the SEA Directive. It was characterised as influential rather than determinative in shaping Parliament's decision on the development. Lord Sumption emphasised that the DNS did not impose constraints on Parliament's ultimate decision-making.
The court tactically framed the case as an interpretation of EU legislation to sidestep potential conflicts with Article 9 of the Bill of Rights, which safeguards parliamentary proceedings from legal questioning. However, in obiter, Lords Neuberger and Mance explored the hypothetical scenario of a conflict between a fundamental statute, such as the Bill of Rights 1688, and the European Communities Act 1972 (ECA). They suggested it was certainly arguable that fundamental statutes exist in the UK constitution, indicating a potential hierarchy where the Bill of Rights may hold more significance than the ECA.
The concept of a hierarchy of constitutional statutes, although providing potential clarity post-Factortame ||, introduces complexities. The resolution of conflicts between fundamental statutes remains challenging, especially without a clear metric to measure fundamentality. This discussion has broader implications for the treatment of EU law within the UK constitutional framework.
