R (Gillan) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2006]
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R (Gillan) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2006] UKHL 12 is a public law case that deals with the stop and search powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and the compatibility of such powers with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
The Assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police had authorised the police to conduct stop and searches under Sections 44 and 45 of the Terrorism Act 2000 for a period of 28 days, a decision later confirmed by the Secretary of State for the Home Department. The judicial review proceedings were initiated by a student and a journalist who had been stopped and searched on their way to a demonstration, leading to a challenge against the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and the Home Secretary.
The primary issues before the House of Lords were twofold. First, the claimants questioned whether the use of stop and search powers infringed upon their Convention rights to liberty, respect for private life, freedom of expression, and freedom of assembly under Article 5, Article 8, Article 10, and Article 11, respectively. Second, the examination focused on whether the authorisations and confirmations were prescribed by law under the relevant articles of the ECHR.
The House of Lords ultimately dismissed the appeal, affirming the lawfulness of the authorisations and confirmations and rejecting the claim of a breach of the ECHR. Lord Bingham of Cornhill provided key insights in his judgment. He emphasised the principle of legality, asserting that despite the broad geographical scope and continuous line of authorisations, the powers were not in violation because they operated under close regulation.
Regarding Article 5, the right to liberty, the Court applied the test established in the ECtHR case HL v United Kingdom [2004], stating that the brevity of the stop-and-search and the nature of the detention meant there was no deprivation of liberty. On the matter of Article 8, concerning the right to respect for private life, the Court found the stop-and-search procedure proportionate for preventing terrorism and, therefore, not a breach of the right.
Articles 10 and 11, pertaining to freedom of expression and assembly, were deemed justifiably restricted as long as the powers were exercised within statutory limits. Lord Bingham further laid down a test for lawfulness under the ECHR, stressing the need for clear and publicly accessible rules of law to prevent arbitrary exercise of power by public officials. Even though the stop-and-search authorisations and confirmations were not made publicly available, Lord Bingham argued that the Terrorism Act 2000 adequately informed the public about the procedure and precisely defined and limited the power, satisfying the lawfulness requirement under the ECHR.
In summary, the Court held that the stop and search powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 were lawful and did not breach the ECHR. Lord Bingham's emphasis on clear and accessible rules of law reflects the importance of preventing arbitrary exercise of power by public officials.
The Assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police had authorised the police to conduct stop and searches under Sections 44 and 45 of the Terrorism Act 2000 for a period of 28 days, a decision later confirmed by the Secretary of State for the Home Department. The judicial review proceedings were initiated by a student and a journalist who had been stopped and searched on their way to a demonstration, leading to a challenge against the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and the Home Secretary.
The primary issues before the House of Lords were twofold. First, the claimants questioned whether the use of stop and search powers infringed upon their Convention rights to liberty, respect for private life, freedom of expression, and freedom of assembly under Article 5, Article 8, Article 10, and Article 11, respectively. Second, the examination focused on whether the authorisations and confirmations were prescribed by law under the relevant articles of the ECHR.
The House of Lords ultimately dismissed the appeal, affirming the lawfulness of the authorisations and confirmations and rejecting the claim of a breach of the ECHR. Lord Bingham of Cornhill provided key insights in his judgment. He emphasised the principle of legality, asserting that despite the broad geographical scope and continuous line of authorisations, the powers were not in violation because they operated under close regulation.
Regarding Article 5, the right to liberty, the Court applied the test established in the ECtHR case HL v United Kingdom [2004], stating that the brevity of the stop-and-search and the nature of the detention meant there was no deprivation of liberty. On the matter of Article 8, concerning the right to respect for private life, the Court found the stop-and-search procedure proportionate for preventing terrorism and, therefore, not a breach of the right.
Articles 10 and 11, pertaining to freedom of expression and assembly, were deemed justifiably restricted as long as the powers were exercised within statutory limits. Lord Bingham further laid down a test for lawfulness under the ECHR, stressing the need for clear and publicly accessible rules of law to prevent arbitrary exercise of power by public officials. Even though the stop-and-search authorisations and confirmations were not made publicly available, Lord Bingham argued that the Terrorism Act 2000 adequately informed the public about the procedure and precisely defined and limited the power, satisfying the lawfulness requirement under the ECHR.
In summary, the Court held that the stop and search powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 were lawful and did not breach the ECHR. Lord Bingham's emphasis on clear and accessible rules of law reflects the importance of preventing arbitrary exercise of power by public officials.
