R (Pinochet Ugarte) v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate [2000]

R (Pinochet Ugarte) v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate [2000] 1 AC 61 is a landmark set of three decisions by the House of Lords, addressing profound questions in constitutional and international criminal law. At the heart of the matter was whether former Chilean dictator General Augusto Pinochet could claim state immunity from prosecution for acts of torture alleged by a Spanish court, and thus resist extradition to Spain. The case set a precedent in clarifying the scope and limits of state immunity, especially in relation to serious violations of international law, such as torture.

The legal saga began when Spanish judge Baltazar Garzón issued an international arrest warrant for Pinochet, who was visiting London for medical treatment. Pinochet was arrested by British authorities under this warrant. His legal team argued that as a former head of state, he was entitled to immunity from prosecution for acts committed during his presidency. The House of Lords, in Pinochet (No 1), delivered a groundbreaking judgment, with a majority of three to two, concluding that Pinochet could not claim immunity for acts of torture. Lords Nicholls, Hoffmann, and Steyn reasoned that the development of international law since the mid-20th century had rendered certain acts, such as torture and crimes against humanity, so egregious that they could not be considered legitimate functions of a head of state. Therefore, international law prohibited immunity for such crimes, even for former state leaders.

However, this initial judgment was short-lived. In Pinochet (No 2), it came to light that one of the Law Lords who had formed the majority in the first judgment, Lord Hoffmann, had close ties with Amnesty International, an organization that had intervened in the case against Pinochet. This raised concerns over the appearance of bias, prompting the House of Lords to set aside its original decision. The second judgment was not concerned with the legal merits of the case itself, but rather with upholding the principle of impartiality in judicial proceedings, underscoring the importance of transparency and fairness in the administration of justice.

Finally, in Pinochet (No 3), a freshly constituted panel of Law Lords revisited the case and once again held that Pinochet was not entitled to state immunity for acts of torture. However, the ruling was limited in scope. The judges determined that he could only be prosecuted for acts of torture committed after the implementation of section 134 of the UK’s Criminal Justice Act 1988, which granted British courts universal jurisdiction over such crimes. As a result, any acts committed before 8 December 1988 were outside the jurisdiction of the UK courts, as prosecuting Pinochet for such acts would violate the principle against retroactive criminal legislation.

This trilogy of rulings has had a lasting influence on international law and human rights. It established the principle that former heads of state could be held accountable for torture and similar grave offences, despite claims of immunity. Furthermore, the case highlighted the role of domestic courts in enforcing international human rights norms and the tension between traditional doctrines of state sovereignty and the emerging global consensus against impunity for serious international crimes.