R v B [2013]
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R v B [2013] EWCA Crim 3 established a significant legal precedent regarding the test for reasonable belief in consent under the Sexual Offences Act. The court clarified that the test is inherently objective, and the mental illness of the defendant should not be considered in assessing the reasonableness of the belief in consent.
The factual background of the case involved the defendant being convicted of raping his partner. The defendant, a paranoid schizophrenic, asserted that he engaged in the act because he believed he possessed sexual healing power. During the trial, the judge instructed the jury to disregard the defendant's mental illness when determining whether he reasonably believed in his partner's consent, as per Section 1(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
The defendant subsequently appealed on the grounds that the judge had misdirected the jury. The Court of Appeal, however, dismissed the appeal, with Hughes LJ delivering the court's reasoning.
Hughes LJ pointed out that the medical evidence in the case demonstrated that the defendant's mental condition did not impair his ability to comprehend whether his partner had consented. Even if it had, Hughes LJ emphasised that a delusional belief stemming from mental illness could not, in law, render reasonable a belief in consent when it did not exist. Unless the defendant's state of mind reaches the threshold of insanity, a belief in consent arising from mental illness must be assessed based on objective standards, excluding considerations of the mental illness itself.
Hughes LJ acknowledged the potential difficulty in drawing a clear line between what constitutes a relevant lack of ability and an irrelevant mental illness. He highlighted that cases involving a defendant's personality or abilities might be relevant, particularly if they hinder the individual's capacity to recognise social cues. Nevertheless, the judge concluded that such cases would be decided based on the specific facts at hand.
In summary, the court established in this case that, in assessing reasonable belief in consent under the Sexual Offences Act, the test is objective, and mental illness, unless reaching the level of insanity, should not be factored into the determination of whether the belief was reasonable. The decision also recognised the potential relevance of a defendant's personality or abilities in certain cases.
The factual background of the case involved the defendant being convicted of raping his partner. The defendant, a paranoid schizophrenic, asserted that he engaged in the act because he believed he possessed sexual healing power. During the trial, the judge instructed the jury to disregard the defendant's mental illness when determining whether he reasonably believed in his partner's consent, as per Section 1(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
The defendant subsequently appealed on the grounds that the judge had misdirected the jury. The Court of Appeal, however, dismissed the appeal, with Hughes LJ delivering the court's reasoning.
Hughes LJ pointed out that the medical evidence in the case demonstrated that the defendant's mental condition did not impair his ability to comprehend whether his partner had consented. Even if it had, Hughes LJ emphasised that a delusional belief stemming from mental illness could not, in law, render reasonable a belief in consent when it did not exist. Unless the defendant's state of mind reaches the threshold of insanity, a belief in consent arising from mental illness must be assessed based on objective standards, excluding considerations of the mental illness itself.
Hughes LJ acknowledged the potential difficulty in drawing a clear line between what constitutes a relevant lack of ability and an irrelevant mental illness. He highlighted that cases involving a defendant's personality or abilities might be relevant, particularly if they hinder the individual's capacity to recognise social cues. Nevertheless, the judge concluded that such cases would be decided based on the specific facts at hand.
In summary, the court established in this case that, in assessing reasonable belief in consent under the Sexual Offences Act, the test is objective, and mental illness, unless reaching the level of insanity, should not be factored into the determination of whether the belief was reasonable. The decision also recognised the potential relevance of a defendant's personality or abilities in certain cases.
