R v Brennan [2014]
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R v Brennan [2014] EWCA Crim 2387 is an English criminal law case concerning the defence of diminished responsibility.
The defendant killed the victim in a savage attack. During the trial, the defendant applied for the defence of diminished responsibility under Section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957, presenting expert evidence that severe mental illnesses impaired his ability to exercise self-control at the time of the attack. The Crown did not call an expert witness, but despite the uncontradicted expert evidence supporting diminished responsibility, the charge of murder was not withdrawn from the jury, and the defendant was ultimately convicted of murder.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, overturning the conviction for murder and substituting it for manslaughter. Davis LJ, in delivering the judgment, emphasised that if diminished responsibility is supported by uncontradicted expert evidence, the trial judge should withdraw the charge of murder from the jury at the close of the evidence if it is found that no properly directed jury would convict. Davis LJ stated that it is unprincipled for the charge to be left to the jury simply because the prosecution wishes it to be.
This case highlights the principle that if there is uncontradicted expert evidence supporting diminished responsibility, and a properly directed jury would not convict of murder, the charge of murder should be withdrawn from the jury. This reflects the importance of ensuring a fair trial and avoiding convictions that would be inconsistent with the evidence presented, particularly when dealing with issues of mental health and diminished responsibility.
The defendant killed the victim in a savage attack. During the trial, the defendant applied for the defence of diminished responsibility under Section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957, presenting expert evidence that severe mental illnesses impaired his ability to exercise self-control at the time of the attack. The Crown did not call an expert witness, but despite the uncontradicted expert evidence supporting diminished responsibility, the charge of murder was not withdrawn from the jury, and the defendant was ultimately convicted of murder.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, overturning the conviction for murder and substituting it for manslaughter. Davis LJ, in delivering the judgment, emphasised that if diminished responsibility is supported by uncontradicted expert evidence, the trial judge should withdraw the charge of murder from the jury at the close of the evidence if it is found that no properly directed jury would convict. Davis LJ stated that it is unprincipled for the charge to be left to the jury simply because the prosecution wishes it to be.
This case highlights the principle that if there is uncontradicted expert evidence supporting diminished responsibility, and a properly directed jury would not convict of murder, the charge of murder should be withdrawn from the jury. This reflects the importance of ensuring a fair trial and avoiding convictions that would be inconsistent with the evidence presented, particularly when dealing with issues of mental health and diminished responsibility.
