R v Golds [2016]
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In R v Golds (Appellant) [2016] UKSC 61, the appellant, Mark Golds, was convicted of the murder of his partner by a jury. The central issue revolved around whether Golds was in the grip of a psychotic condition at the time of the killing, meeting the criteria for the partial defence of diminished responsibility and thereby reducing the charge to manslaughter. The applicable law was Section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957, as revised by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, with the key test being whether Golds' ability to understand, form rational judgments, or exercise self-control was "substantially impaired".
During the trial, the judge correctly identified the questions for the jury and provided a written summary of the ingredients of diminished responsibility. On the issue of substantial impairment, the judge informed the jury that specific guidance on the meaning of "substantially" would not be given unless requested. The jury did not seek further clarification. Golds appealed, raising questions about the judge's direction on the meaning of "substantial".
The Court of Appeal dismissed Golds' appeal, asserting that there was no requirement for the judge to provide a specific direction on the meaning of "substantial". The case then proceeded to the Supreme Court, where the unanimous decision was to dismiss Golds' appeal.
Lord Hughes, delivering the judgment, clarified that in a murder trial involving diminished responsibility, the judge is not ordinarily required to go beyond the terms of the statute and define the meaning of "substantial". However, if there is a risk of jury misunderstanding, a direction becomes necessary. Whether such a risk exists is at the discretion of the judge. The judgment emphasised that an impairment must be more than merely trivial to be considered substantial, but not any impairment beyond trivial would suffice.
Lord Hughes conducted a comprehensive review of the treatment of "substantial impairment" in cases from both England and Scotland. The expression was consistently treated as a question of degree, left to the jury to decide. The judgment clarified that "substantial" in this context means impairment of importance or a serious degree. There was no indication that Parliament intended a different meaning in the revised law.
In conclusion, the judgment affirmed that, in most cases, a judge need not define ordinary words like "substantial" for the jury. Any attempt to find synonyms or redefine such words complicates the jury's task. The judge may offer help if needed, but caution must be exercised to avoid substituting a single synonym. The review of the authorities highlighted the consistent understanding that "substantial impairment" is a matter of degree and should be determined by the jury.
During the trial, the judge correctly identified the questions for the jury and provided a written summary of the ingredients of diminished responsibility. On the issue of substantial impairment, the judge informed the jury that specific guidance on the meaning of "substantially" would not be given unless requested. The jury did not seek further clarification. Golds appealed, raising questions about the judge's direction on the meaning of "substantial".
The Court of Appeal dismissed Golds' appeal, asserting that there was no requirement for the judge to provide a specific direction on the meaning of "substantial". The case then proceeded to the Supreme Court, where the unanimous decision was to dismiss Golds' appeal.
Lord Hughes, delivering the judgment, clarified that in a murder trial involving diminished responsibility, the judge is not ordinarily required to go beyond the terms of the statute and define the meaning of "substantial". However, if there is a risk of jury misunderstanding, a direction becomes necessary. Whether such a risk exists is at the discretion of the judge. The judgment emphasised that an impairment must be more than merely trivial to be considered substantial, but not any impairment beyond trivial would suffice.
Lord Hughes conducted a comprehensive review of the treatment of "substantial impairment" in cases from both England and Scotland. The expression was consistently treated as a question of degree, left to the jury to decide. The judgment clarified that "substantial" in this context means impairment of importance or a serious degree. There was no indication that Parliament intended a different meaning in the revised law.
In conclusion, the judgment affirmed that, in most cases, a judge need not define ordinary words like "substantial" for the jury. Any attempt to find synonyms or redefine such words complicates the jury's task. The judge may offer help if needed, but caution must be exercised to avoid substituting a single synonym. The review of the authorities highlighted the consistent understanding that "substantial impairment" is a matter of degree and should be determined by the jury.
