R v Hancock and Shankland [1985]
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R v Hancock and Shankland [1985] UKHL 9 is a pivotal decision by the House of Lords that helped refine the relationship between foresight of consequences and intention in the context of criminal law, specifically in cases of murder. This case arose during the 1984-1985 miners' strike in the UK, where the defendants, striking miners, took actions intended to frighten someone but resulted in an unintended death. The decision addressed the adequacy of the Moloney guidelines on intention, emphasising the importance of the probability of consequences in determining intent.
The defendants, Hancock and Shankland, dropped a concrete block from a bridge with the intention of frightening a coal miner who was being taken to work in a taxi. However, instead of simply frightening the miner, the taxi driver, David Wilkie, was killed by the falling block. The defendants admitted that their intention was only to scare the miner, not to kill or cause serious harm, and offered to plead guilty to manslaughter. The prosecution rejected this plea and pursued convictions for murder. At trial, the defendants were convicted of murder, with the trial judge instructing the jury that they should focus on whether serious harm was a natural consequence of the defendants' actions.
The trial judge relied on the guidelines from the earlier case of R v Moloney [1985], which directed the jury to consider whether a reasonable person would conclude that the defendants' actions were likely to cause serious harm. The jury sought further clarification about the legal distinction between murder and manslaughter, particularly with regard to the defendants' intention and foresight of consequences. The judge, however, did not elaborate on the significance of foresight or its role in determining intent. As a result, the jury convicted the defendants of murder, and they were sentenced to life imprisonment.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the Moloney guidelines used at trial were inadequate. Specifically, the court held that the jury had not been properly instructed on how to weigh the defendants' foresight of consequences, namely, whether they had foreseen death or serious injury as a likely result of their actions. The Court of Appeal emphasised that, as established in Moloney, for foresight to indicate intent, the probability of the consequence occurring must be extremely high, or little short of overwhelming. Since the jury had not been directed on how to assess this, the Court of Appeal substituted the murder convictions with manslaughter.
The case was further appealed by the prosecution to the House of Lords, which upheld the Court of Appeal's decision and confirmed that the Moloney guidelines were insufficient in cases involving foresight of consequences. The Lords reiterated that foresight of consequences is not the same as intention, but it is evidence that can help a jury infer intent. The Lords also stressed that the probability of death or serious harm resulting from the defendants' actions is a critical factor in determining whether they intended to cause that outcome. The higher the probability of the result, the stronger the inference of intent, but foresight alone does not automatically establish intent.
The House of Lords clarified that in murder cases, the jury must carefully consider whether the defendant foresaw the outcome of their actions as a virtual certainty. If so, the jury may infer intent, but they are not required to do so. The decision emphasised the need for judges to properly guide juries on how to consider the probability of the result when deciding whether the defendant acted with intent to kill or cause serious harm.
The Hancock and Shankland case was significant in shaping the legal understanding of oblique intent and the role of foresight in determining criminal liability. It built on earlier rulings, such as R v Moloney [1985], but refined the approach to intent by emphasising the importance of probability. The ruling clarified that foresight of a virtually certain consequence is merely evidence from which intent can be inferred, not proof of intent itself. This case laid the foundation for further legal developments in cases involving indirect or unintended consequences, influencing later decisions such as R v Nedrick [1986] and R v Woollin.
In conclusion, R v Hancock and Shankland remains an important case in English criminal law, particularly in clarifying how courts should assess foresight of consequences and intention. It helped establish a clearer distinction between murder and manslaughter, ensuring that juries must consider the likelihood of death or serious harm and whether the defendant foresaw such outcomes when determining intent. The decision continues to be cited in discussions of oblique intent and the principles of foresight in criminal responsibility.
The defendants, Hancock and Shankland, dropped a concrete block from a bridge with the intention of frightening a coal miner who was being taken to work in a taxi. However, instead of simply frightening the miner, the taxi driver, David Wilkie, was killed by the falling block. The defendants admitted that their intention was only to scare the miner, not to kill or cause serious harm, and offered to plead guilty to manslaughter. The prosecution rejected this plea and pursued convictions for murder. At trial, the defendants were convicted of murder, with the trial judge instructing the jury that they should focus on whether serious harm was a natural consequence of the defendants' actions.
The trial judge relied on the guidelines from the earlier case of R v Moloney [1985], which directed the jury to consider whether a reasonable person would conclude that the defendants' actions were likely to cause serious harm. The jury sought further clarification about the legal distinction between murder and manslaughter, particularly with regard to the defendants' intention and foresight of consequences. The judge, however, did not elaborate on the significance of foresight or its role in determining intent. As a result, the jury convicted the defendants of murder, and they were sentenced to life imprisonment.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the Moloney guidelines used at trial were inadequate. Specifically, the court held that the jury had not been properly instructed on how to weigh the defendants' foresight of consequences, namely, whether they had foreseen death or serious injury as a likely result of their actions. The Court of Appeal emphasised that, as established in Moloney, for foresight to indicate intent, the probability of the consequence occurring must be extremely high, or little short of overwhelming. Since the jury had not been directed on how to assess this, the Court of Appeal substituted the murder convictions with manslaughter.
The case was further appealed by the prosecution to the House of Lords, which upheld the Court of Appeal's decision and confirmed that the Moloney guidelines were insufficient in cases involving foresight of consequences. The Lords reiterated that foresight of consequences is not the same as intention, but it is evidence that can help a jury infer intent. The Lords also stressed that the probability of death or serious harm resulting from the defendants' actions is a critical factor in determining whether they intended to cause that outcome. The higher the probability of the result, the stronger the inference of intent, but foresight alone does not automatically establish intent.
The House of Lords clarified that in murder cases, the jury must carefully consider whether the defendant foresaw the outcome of their actions as a virtual certainty. If so, the jury may infer intent, but they are not required to do so. The decision emphasised the need for judges to properly guide juries on how to consider the probability of the result when deciding whether the defendant acted with intent to kill or cause serious harm.
The Hancock and Shankland case was significant in shaping the legal understanding of oblique intent and the role of foresight in determining criminal liability. It built on earlier rulings, such as R v Moloney [1985], but refined the approach to intent by emphasising the importance of probability. The ruling clarified that foresight of a virtually certain consequence is merely evidence from which intent can be inferred, not proof of intent itself. This case laid the foundation for further legal developments in cases involving indirect or unintended consequences, influencing later decisions such as R v Nedrick [1986] and R v Woollin.
In conclusion, R v Hancock and Shankland remains an important case in English criminal law, particularly in clarifying how courts should assess foresight of consequences and intention. It helped establish a clearer distinction between murder and manslaughter, ensuring that juries must consider the likelihood of death or serious harm and whether the defendant foresaw such outcomes when determining intent. The decision continues to be cited in discussions of oblique intent and the principles of foresight in criminal responsibility.
