R v Linekar [1995]
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R v Linekar [1995] 3 All ER 69 established a significant legal principle regarding the impact of fraud on the validity of consent in sexual offences. The court held that, at common law, fraud that did not induce a mistake about the nature of the act or the identity of the person does not vitiate consent.
Linekar, the defendant, hiring a prostitute but subsequently refusing to pay her after the sexual act. Linekar was initially convicted of rape based on the failure to fulfil the financial agreement.
However, upon appeal, the Court of Appeal overturned the conviction. The court's decision rested on the finding that there was no mistake as to the nature of the sexual act or the identity of the defendant. In other words, the fraud committed by Linekar did not induce a misunderstanding about the essential elements of the encounter, and therefore, consent was not vitiated.
It is important to point out the distinction between common law principles and the provisions introduced by the Sexual Offences Act 2003. While at common law, a mistake as to the purpose of an act did not generally vitiate consent, the current law under Section 76 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 takes a different approach. Under Section 76, deception as to purpose can raise a conclusive presumption that consent is vitiated.
The court in the later case of R v Jheeta [2007] further emphasised that deception as to purpose did not apply in the context of R v Linekar. Consequently, Section 76(2)(a) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, which addresses deception as to purpose, was deemed not to be applicable in the Linekar case.
R v Linekar underscores the legal nuances involved in assessing the impact of fraud on consent, highlighting the importance of understanding the specific elements that can vitiate consent in different legal contexts.
Linekar, the defendant, hiring a prostitute but subsequently refusing to pay her after the sexual act. Linekar was initially convicted of rape based on the failure to fulfil the financial agreement.
However, upon appeal, the Court of Appeal overturned the conviction. The court's decision rested on the finding that there was no mistake as to the nature of the sexual act or the identity of the defendant. In other words, the fraud committed by Linekar did not induce a misunderstanding about the essential elements of the encounter, and therefore, consent was not vitiated.
It is important to point out the distinction between common law principles and the provisions introduced by the Sexual Offences Act 2003. While at common law, a mistake as to the purpose of an act did not generally vitiate consent, the current law under Section 76 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 takes a different approach. Under Section 76, deception as to purpose can raise a conclusive presumption that consent is vitiated.
The court in the later case of R v Jheeta [2007] further emphasised that deception as to purpose did not apply in the context of R v Linekar. Consequently, Section 76(2)(a) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, which addresses deception as to purpose, was deemed not to be applicable in the Linekar case.
R v Linekar underscores the legal nuances involved in assessing the impact of fraud on consent, highlighting the importance of understanding the specific elements that can vitiate consent in different legal contexts.
