R v Quayle [2005]

R v Quayle and Others [2005]; Attorney General’s Reference (No. 2 of 2004) [2005] EWCA Crim 1415 is a leading case on the limits of the necessity and duress of circumstances defences in the context of drug offences. The defendants had been convicted of offences involving the cultivation or possession of cannabis. Their central argument on appeal was that their use of cannabis was medically necessary, as it provided effective pain relief with fewer side effects than conventional medication. They contended that their actions were justified because they were aimed at preventing serious suffering caused by chronic pain.

The Court of Appeal rejected the defence. It held that recognising a medical necessity to use cannabis would undermine the purpose of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, which was to strictly regulate controlled substances, including cannabis. The court stressed that, for necessity or duress of circumstances to apply, the threat of death or serious injury must be immediate and imminent. Chronic pain, while serious and ongoing, was not considered to present the kind of urgent and unavoidable peril required for the defence to succeed.

The defendants also argued that their prosecution violated Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which protects the right to respect for private life. The court accepted that the prohibition on cannabis use interfered with this right. However, it held that such interference could be justified if it was “necessary in a democratic society” to protect public health and safety. Regulating controlled drugs fell squarely within this justification. Moreover, the court considered that decisions about whether cannabis should be permitted for medical purposes were matters of social and health policy, which should be left to the relevant government minister rather than determined by the courts.

This case is significant because it firmly closed the door on the use of necessity as a defence for medical cannabis use under existing UK law. It reinforced that the requirement of immediacy in duress and necessity defences cannot be satisfied by long-term medical conditions and that drug control policy is a matter for Parliament and the executive, not the judiciary.