R v Richardson [1999]
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R v Richardson [1999] QB 444, [1999] Crim LR 62 concerned whether fraud regarding matters not sufficiently integral to one's identity, such as professional qualifications, could vitiate consent to acts resulting in actual bodily harm.
Richardson, the defendant, was a dentist who had been disqualified but continued to treat patients without disclosing her suspension. He faced six charges of assault occasioning actual bodily harm even though her patients had consented to the treatment.
The trial judge ruled against the defence's submission that the patients had consented to the procedures, asserting that the fraud related to her credentials invalidated any such consent. However, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, resulting in the quashing of the conviction.
The judgment, delivered by Otton LJ, established that fraud could only vitiate consent to actual bodily harm if the victim was deceived about the nature of the act performed or the identity of the performer. In this context, the identity of the person did not extend to knowledge of Richardson's qualifications or attributes. Therefore, the court concluded that Richardson's fraud regarding her suspension did not invalidate the consent given by the patients.
Otton LJ emphasised that lesser forms of fraud might be sufficient for civil claims, and while Richardson's conduct was reprehensible and could give rise to a civil claim, it did not warrant criminal liability for assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The decision clarified the specific circumstances under which fraud could impact the validity of consent in cases involving actual bodily harm.
Richardson, the defendant, was a dentist who had been disqualified but continued to treat patients without disclosing her suspension. He faced six charges of assault occasioning actual bodily harm even though her patients had consented to the treatment.
The trial judge ruled against the defence's submission that the patients had consented to the procedures, asserting that the fraud related to her credentials invalidated any such consent. However, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, resulting in the quashing of the conviction.
The judgment, delivered by Otton LJ, established that fraud could only vitiate consent to actual bodily harm if the victim was deceived about the nature of the act performed or the identity of the performer. In this context, the identity of the person did not extend to knowledge of Richardson's qualifications or attributes. Therefore, the court concluded that Richardson's fraud regarding her suspension did not invalidate the consent given by the patients.
Otton LJ emphasised that lesser forms of fraud might be sufficient for civil claims, and while Richardson's conduct was reprehensible and could give rise to a civil claim, it did not warrant criminal liability for assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The decision clarified the specific circumstances under which fraud could impact the validity of consent in cases involving actual bodily harm.
