R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms [2000]
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R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms [1999] UKHL 33, [2000] 2 AC 115 concerned the restriction imposed by the Home Secretary on prisoners' oral interviews with journalists. Simms and another prisoner, both serving life sentences for murder, challenged the Home Secretary's stance, arguing that it violated their right to freedom of speech as protected under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
Under the authority of the Prison Act 1952 Section 47(1), the Home Secretary had enacted Prison Service Standing Order 5, paragraph 37-A. This order limited oral interviews with journalists, asserting that the content must remain unpublished. The prisoners contended that this restriction hindered the possibility of any meaningful investigation into their convictions, as speaking out was crucial to such inquiries. Despite this restriction, the prisoners were still permitted to engage in written correspondence.
The prisoners sought judicial review proceedings to challenge the Home Secretary's restriction. Latham J initially ruled in favour of allowing oral interviews, but the Court of Appeal overturned this decision, concluding that the prisoners were not entitled to conduct such interviews.
Upon appeal, the House of Lords sided with the prisoners. Lord Steyn delivered the leading judgment. Lord Hoffmann concurred, emphasising that while parliamentary sovereignty allows legislation contrary to fundamental human rights, the principle of legality requires Parliament to openly confront the political consequences of such actions. This means that fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general or ambiguous language in legislation.
The case is noteworthy for establishing that parliamentary sovereignty, while a fundamental principle in the UK legal system, does not grant unlimited power to legislate against basic human rights. The judgment underscored the importance of clear and explicit language in legislation when attempting to restrict fundamental rights. It highlighted the courts' role in ensuring that even general legislative language is presumed to be subject to the basic rights of individuals, aligning the UK legal system with constitutional principles found in other countries with express limitations on legislative power.
Under the authority of the Prison Act 1952 Section 47(1), the Home Secretary had enacted Prison Service Standing Order 5, paragraph 37-A. This order limited oral interviews with journalists, asserting that the content must remain unpublished. The prisoners contended that this restriction hindered the possibility of any meaningful investigation into their convictions, as speaking out was crucial to such inquiries. Despite this restriction, the prisoners were still permitted to engage in written correspondence.
The prisoners sought judicial review proceedings to challenge the Home Secretary's restriction. Latham J initially ruled in favour of allowing oral interviews, but the Court of Appeal overturned this decision, concluding that the prisoners were not entitled to conduct such interviews.
Upon appeal, the House of Lords sided with the prisoners. Lord Steyn delivered the leading judgment. Lord Hoffmann concurred, emphasising that while parliamentary sovereignty allows legislation contrary to fundamental human rights, the principle of legality requires Parliament to openly confront the political consequences of such actions. This means that fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general or ambiguous language in legislation.
The case is noteworthy for establishing that parliamentary sovereignty, while a fundamental principle in the UK legal system, does not grant unlimited power to legislate against basic human rights. The judgment underscored the importance of clear and explicit language in legislation when attempting to restrict fundamental rights. It highlighted the courts' role in ensuring that even general legislative language is presumed to be subject to the basic rights of individuals, aligning the UK legal system with constitutional principles found in other countries with express limitations on legislative power.
