Re Inns [1947]
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Re Inns [1947] Ch 576 involves a trust created by a testator in his will. The key point in this case is that the trust imposed a requirement of consent for the sale of land, and this requirement was considered binding.
The testator left a large sum of money in his will for the benefit of his wife. The will also included a trust provision for land, which could only be sold with the consent of both his widow and the council. If the land was not sold, the wife had a life interest in the property, and the council would have the land afterward for use as a hospital. The widow desired to sell the house, but the council refused to give consent. The widow applied to the court, seeking an order for the sale of the house. She argued that the settlor intended for her to live in Springfield, but the income provided under the will was insufficient.
The court, represented by Wynn-Parry J, denied the order for the sale of the house, citing the binding nature of the requirement for consent. The judge considered the reasonableness and sufficiency of the provision made for the widow by the will, taking into account her position and her husband's wealth. Wynn-Parry J emphasised that a judge cannot interfere simply because they might have made different provisions if they were in the testator's position. The key is whether the provision made is unreasonable, considering all relevant circumstances, including the relations and wealth of the parties. Despite the judge's personal inclination to not tie up the property with the requirement for council consent, the judge asserted that he did not have the power to alter this provision.
In summary, the court held that the requirement of consent for the sale of land in the trust was binding, and the judge could not override it based on personal preferences. The reasonableness of the provision made in the will was a crucial factor in the decision.
The testator left a large sum of money in his will for the benefit of his wife. The will also included a trust provision for land, which could only be sold with the consent of both his widow and the council. If the land was not sold, the wife had a life interest in the property, and the council would have the land afterward for use as a hospital. The widow desired to sell the house, but the council refused to give consent. The widow applied to the court, seeking an order for the sale of the house. She argued that the settlor intended for her to live in Springfield, but the income provided under the will was insufficient.
The court, represented by Wynn-Parry J, denied the order for the sale of the house, citing the binding nature of the requirement for consent. The judge considered the reasonableness and sufficiency of the provision made for the widow by the will, taking into account her position and her husband's wealth. Wynn-Parry J emphasised that a judge cannot interfere simply because they might have made different provisions if they were in the testator's position. The key is whether the provision made is unreasonable, considering all relevant circumstances, including the relations and wealth of the parties. Despite the judge's personal inclination to not tie up the property with the requirement for council consent, the judge asserted that he did not have the power to alter this provision.
In summary, the court held that the requirement of consent for the sale of land in the trust was binding, and the judge could not override it based on personal preferences. The reasonableness of the provision made in the will was a crucial factor in the decision.
