Rules of Statutory Interpretation

Statutory interpretation is a crucial aspect of legal practice where courts determine the meaning of legislation and apply it to specific cases. Over time, the judiciary has developed rules to guide this process. Here are the four most commonly used rules of statutory interpretation.

Literal Rule
The literal rule involves interpreting the words of a statute according to their plain, ordinary, and natural meaning. This approach does not take into account the consequences of a literal interpretation and assumes that the legislature intended the words of the statute to be taken at face value, without any further interpretation.

For example in Whiteley v Chappel (1868), the court applied the literal rule and concluded that Whiteley could not be convicted of impersonating "any person entitled to vote" at an election because the person he impersonated was dead and the deceased was not "a person entitled to vote".

Golden Rule
The golden rule involves interpreting the words of a statute in a way that avoids any absurd or unreasonable results. This approach can be used to avoid the absurd consequences of a literal interpretation of the wording of a statute as it allows for some flexibility in the interpretation of the words, while still adhering to the intention of the legislature.

In Warburton v Loveland (1832), the court established the principles of the golden rule which require that courts must interpret statute "according to the intent of them that made it" and that the words of the statute speak the intention of the Legislature".

In Grey v Pearson (1857), the court provided further guidelines in the application of the rule:

"In construing ... statutes ... the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid the absurdity and inconsistency, but no farther."

The golden rule may be applied in a narrow sense when there is ambiguity or absurdity in the wording of a statute. For instance, in R v Allen (1872), the defendant was charged with bigamy, an offence involving marrying while one’s spouse is still alive and not divorced. The court interpreted the word "marry" under Section 57 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 as "going through a second ceremony of marriage" because it is legally impossible to be validly married to someone else while already married.

The golden rule, in its broader sense, may also be employed to prevent results that contradict principles of public policy, even if the statutory language has a clear meaning. For example, in Adler v George (1964), the court interpreted "in the vicinity of" to include a person already on the premises. This interpretation was used to convict the defendant of obstructing a military guard in the execution of his duty within a military establishment, as the obstruction occurred inside the establishment.

Mischief Rule
The mischief rule involves interpreting the words of a statute in a way that addresses the mischief that the statute was intended to remedy. This approach looks at the problem or issue that the legislature was trying to address when it passed the law, and interprets the words of the statute accordingly.

This rule was established in Heydon’s Case (1584), where the court outline four criteria that must be considered:

1. What was the common law before the making of the Act.
2. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide.
3. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth.
4. The true reason of the remedy.

The mischief rule requires consideration of both the exact wording of the statute and the legislators' intentions. Essentially, this rule involves determining whether Parliament, in enacting the statute, intended to address a specific mischief, even if that mischief is not explicitly covered by a literal reading of the statute's language.

The application of this rule is narrower than that of the golden rule or the plain meaning rule because it is only applicable to statutes enacted to remedy a particular defect. For example in Smith v Hughes (1960), because the intention of the Street Offences Act 1959 was to cover the mischief of harassment from prostitutes, the court interpreted "loiter or solicit in the street for the purposes of prostitution" as including calling to men in the street from balconies and tapping on windows in order to convict the defendant. 

Purposive Approach
The purposive approach involves interpreting the words of a statute in a way that best achieves the overall purpose or intention of the law. It is derived from the mischief rule and is intended to serve as an alternative to the other rules of interpretation. This approach considers the broader context and purpose of the law, including its historical, social, and political background, to determine the meaning of the words.

The purposive approach was established in Pepper v Hart (1993), which allows courts to refer to statements made in the House of Commons or the House of Lords to ascertain the intended meaning of the legislation. As a result of this ruling, extraneous materials from the pre-enactment phase of legislation, such as early drafts, Hansard records, committee reports, and white papers, may be used to clarify ambiguities and determine Parliament's intention.

Previously, using materials from the pre-enactment phase was considered a breach of parliamentary privilege. However, following this ruling, courts can now utilise such materials to interpret legislation when traditional methods of statutory interpretation are inconclusive or would lead to absurd results. However, in Project for the Registration of Children as British Citizens v Secretary of State for the Home Department (2022), the Supreme Court emphasised a need to look at the statutory language itself and discouraged reliance on parliamentary materials or other extrinsic aids to interpretation.

In short, each of these rules of statutory interpretation can be applied in different situations, depending on the specific wording and context of the law in question. In practice, judges and legal professionals may use a combination of these rules, as well as other methods of interpretation, to arrive at the most appropriate and accurate interpretation of the law.