Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority [2012]

Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority [2012] UKSC 22 arose from an extradition request by Swedish authorities in relation to allegations of sexual offences against Julian Assange. At the heart of the legal dispute was whether a European Arrest Warrant (EAW) issued by a Swedish public prosecutor was valid under UK law, specifically under the Extradition Act 2003, which implemented the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant (2002/584/JHA) into domestic law. Assange argued that the Swedish prosecutor who issued the EAW was not a "judicial authority" as required by Article 6 of the Framework Decision and Sections 2(2) and 66 of the 2003 Act. He contended that the term "judicial authority" must refer to a body that is independent and impartial, and that prosecutors, being parties to the criminal process, could not meet this standard. He further submitted that even if the Framework Decision permitted prosecutors to issue warrants, the UK Parliament had not intended to include them within the meaning of "judicial authority" under the 2003 Act.

The Supreme Court, by a majority of 5 to 2, dismissed the appeal and held that a public prosecutor could validly be considered a "judicial authority" for the purposes of issuing an EAW. The majority relied on the broader context and purpose of the Framework Decision, which sought to establish a uniform and effective extradition system across EU member states. They noted that a number of member states had designated prosecutors as competent authorities for the issuance of EAWs, and that this practice had been accepted without criticism in subsequent European Council reviews. Although earlier drafts of the Framework Decision had explicitly included prosecutors as judicial authorities, the majority concluded that the removal of such language was not intended to limit the meaning to judges or courts. Rather, the phrase "competent judicial authority" in Article 6(3) allowed for some diversity in national legal systems, and the Supreme Court should interpret the 2003 Act in a way that conformed to the UK’s international obligations under EU law. There was also a strong domestic presumption in favour of construing legislation in a manner that avoided placing the UK in breach of those obligations.

Lord Phillips, giving one of the majority judgments, emphasised that had the drafters of the Framework Decision intended to exclude prosecutors, they would have said so explicitly. He further noted that significant procedural safeguards existed prior to the issuance of the EAW, such as the requirement of a domestic warrant, which provided protection against arbitrary use of prosecutorial power. Lords Walker, Brown, and Dyson agreed, albeit with varying degrees of emphasis. Lord Kerr additionally pointed to the administrative tradition in several EU states where prosecutors routinely issued arrest warrants and observed that a contrary interpretation would disrupt these systems without strong justification. The majority also held that parliamentary debates on the 2003 Act were inadmissible under Pepper v Hart [1993] because there was no ambiguity in the meaning of “judicial authority” once the Framework Decision was properly understood in context.

In dissent, Lord Mance and Lady Hale argued that the term "judicial authority" as used in the 2003 Act should be interpreted according to its natural, ordinary meaning, namely, a judge or court. They were not convinced that the Framework Decision clearly encompassed prosecutors within this term. Lord Mance stressed that the presumption in favour of compliance with international obligations must yield to the clear words of the statute and pointed to ministerial assurances made during parliamentary debates indicating that only judges or courts would have the power to issue EAWs. Lady Hale agreed that the legislative history supported this narrower interpretation and that there was insufficient justification to adopt a broader EU-based meaning that diverged from Parliament’s apparent intention.

This case is significant both for its substantive impact on UK extradition law and for its constitutional implications. It reaffirmed the principle that UK courts will generally interpret domestic legislation in a manner consistent with the UK’s international obligations, especially when implementing EU law. It also illustrated the Supreme Court's readiness to adopt a purposive and contextual approach to statutory interpretation, particularly in areas of EU-derived law. However, the strong dissents underscored ongoing tensions about the role of parliamentary intention and the scope of judicial deference in the face of supranational legal frameworks. The decision marked an important moment in the jurisprudence surrounding the EAW and set the tone for future interpretation of UK legislation that gives effect to EU measures, even as the UK’s relationship with EU law evolved in the years that followed.