Coventry v Lawrence (No 2) [2014]

Coventry v Lawrence (No 2) [2014] UKSC 46 focused on issues arising from its earlier judgment in Coventry v Lawrence [2014] UKSC 13, which addressed the liability of stadium operators for noise nuisance. This case delved into significant aspects of nuisance law, including landlord liability, the relationship between planning permission and nuisance, and procedural questions around injunctions and costs. Below is an exploration of the facts, legal issues, and key findings of the case.

The appellants, Katherine Lawrence and Raymond Shields, owned a residential property, Fenland, located 850 yards from a stadium used for speedway and other motorcar racing. The noise generated by the stadium and a motocross track on the property gave rise to the claim for nuisance. Although the stadium and track were operated by tenants (the respondents), the appellants also sought to hold the landlords liable, arguing that they had authorised or participated in the nuisance.

At trial, the judge ruled in favour of the appellants, finding the respondents liable in nuisance and granting an injunction to restrict noise emissions from the stadium and track. However, the landlords were not held liable, as they had not authorised or participated in the nuisance. This judgment was overturned by the Court of Appeal, which concluded that the activities did not constitute a nuisance. The Supreme Court restored the trial judge’s decision and addressed additional issues regarding landlord liability, injunctions, and costs.

A central issue in this case was whether the landlords could be held liable for their tenants’ nuisance. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that landlord liability arises only if the nuisance was authorised by the landlord at the time of the letting; or
Actively participated in by the landlord during the tenancy.

Lord Neuberger, delivering the main judgment, emphasised that for authorisation to be established, the nuisance must be an inevitable or nearly certain consequence of the letting. In this case, the intended uses of the stadium and track were well-known to the landlords and could be carried out without causing nuisance. Therefore, the landlords had not authorised the nuisance through the letting.

On the question of active participation, the court held that this is largely a factual determination. Despite the appellants’ arguments, the evidence did not demonstrate that the landlords had directly participated in the nuisance. However, Lord Carnwath, in a dissenting opinion, argued that the landlords had encouraged the nuisance and should have been held liable.

The court also considered procedural issues related to the injunction granted at trial. The injunction restricted noise levels but was stayed until Fenland, which had been damaged by fire, was rebuilt and fit for habitation. The respondents sought to have the injunction further suspended, arguing it was unnecessary until the property was restored.

Lord Neuberger concluded that the injunction should remain suspended until Fenland was fit for occupation, unless it could be shown that the suspension prevented or delayed the property’s restoration. This pragmatic approach balanced the rights of the appellants with the practical realities of the situation.

A significant question in the case was the extent to which planning permission affects the determination of nuisance. The respondents argued that planning permission granted for the stadium and track activities should influence whether those activities constituted a nuisance.

The court rejected the notion that planning permission could authorise a nuisance or deprive a claimant of the right to object. However, it acknowledged that planning permission might be relevant to assessing the character of the locality and the reasonableness of the alleged nuisance. For instance, planning conditions permitting noisy activities at specific times could inform the court’s assessment of whether the noise levels were excessive.