James-Bowen v Commissioner of Police of Metropolis [2018]
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James-Bowen and others v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2018] UKSC 40 is a Supreme Court case involving four police officers in the arrest of a suspected terrorist in 2003 who later accused the officers of serious assault, leading to legal proceedings.
The officers initiated civil proceedings against the Commissioner in 2007, alleging that he was vicariously liable for the alleged assaults suffered by the suspected terrorist. The case was settled in 2009, with the Commissioner admitting liability and apologising for the violence. Subsequently, the police officers were acquitted of criminal charges related to the arrest. In 2013, the police officers commenced proceedings seeking compensation for reputational, economic, and psychiatric damage, advancing three claims: (i) a retainer had arisen between them and the Commissioner’s legal team, (ii) the Commissioner had assumed a duty of care due to assurances, and (iii) the Commissioner owed them a duty to take reasonable care in safeguarding their interests.
However, in 2015, the judge struck out these claims. The officers appealed, and the Court of Appeal partially upheld their claims, stating that the Commissioner owed a duty of care to safeguard the officers' economic and reputational interests. The Commissioner appealed on this issue to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court unanimously allowed the appeal, with Lord Lloyd-Jones giving the judgment. The court considered the officers' argument that a duty of care could be derived from an implied term of mutual trust and confidence analogous to employment contracts. However, the court found no precedent supporting this claim and emphasised the need to establish a duty of care in the tort of negligence incrementally and by analogy with previous decisions.
The court highlighted that the common law typically does not recognise a duty of care in negligence to protect reputational interests. The decision in Calveley v Chief Constable of Merseyside Police [1989] was cited, stating that a Chief Constable does not owe a duty of care to protect the economic and reputational interests of officers in the prosecution of investigations or disciplinary proceedings.
The judgment considered conflicting duties and policy considerations, noting the fundamental differences in interests between employers and employees. The court concluded that it would not be fair, just, or reasonable to impose a duty of care on an employer to defend legal proceedings to protect the economic or reputational interests of employees.
Policy considerations and the practical conduct of proceedings were also cited as factors against recognising the duty of care. The court rejected the officers' argument that common interest privilege supported their claim and emphasised that something more than a shared interest in the outcome of litigation is required for such privilege.
In summary, the Supreme Court found that the officers' claims did not establish a duty of care on the part of the Commissioner to safeguard their economic and reputational interests.
The officers initiated civil proceedings against the Commissioner in 2007, alleging that he was vicariously liable for the alleged assaults suffered by the suspected terrorist. The case was settled in 2009, with the Commissioner admitting liability and apologising for the violence. Subsequently, the police officers were acquitted of criminal charges related to the arrest. In 2013, the police officers commenced proceedings seeking compensation for reputational, economic, and psychiatric damage, advancing three claims: (i) a retainer had arisen between them and the Commissioner’s legal team, (ii) the Commissioner had assumed a duty of care due to assurances, and (iii) the Commissioner owed them a duty to take reasonable care in safeguarding their interests.
However, in 2015, the judge struck out these claims. The officers appealed, and the Court of Appeal partially upheld their claims, stating that the Commissioner owed a duty of care to safeguard the officers' economic and reputational interests. The Commissioner appealed on this issue to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court unanimously allowed the appeal, with Lord Lloyd-Jones giving the judgment. The court considered the officers' argument that a duty of care could be derived from an implied term of mutual trust and confidence analogous to employment contracts. However, the court found no precedent supporting this claim and emphasised the need to establish a duty of care in the tort of negligence incrementally and by analogy with previous decisions.
The court highlighted that the common law typically does not recognise a duty of care in negligence to protect reputational interests. The decision in Calveley v Chief Constable of Merseyside Police [1989] was cited, stating that a Chief Constable does not owe a duty of care to protect the economic and reputational interests of officers in the prosecution of investigations or disciplinary proceedings.
The judgment considered conflicting duties and policy considerations, noting the fundamental differences in interests between employers and employees. The court concluded that it would not be fair, just, or reasonable to impose a duty of care on an employer to defend legal proceedings to protect the economic or reputational interests of employees.
Policy considerations and the practical conduct of proceedings were also cited as factors against recognising the duty of care. The court rejected the officers' argument that common interest privilege supported their claim and emphasised that something more than a shared interest in the outcome of litigation is required for such privilege.
In summary, the Supreme Court found that the officers' claims did not establish a duty of care on the part of the Commissioner to safeguard their economic and reputational interests.
