National Crime Agency v Dong [2017]
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National Crime Agency v Dong [2017] EWHC 3116 revolves around the question of whether the presumption of resulting trust is negated by Section 60(3) of the Law of Property Act 1925 (LPA 1925). In this legal dispute, the National Crime Agency (NCA) pursued Dong for unpaid taxes. Dong had transferred ownership of his home to his friend Feng but continued residing there with his family. The NCA argued that the property was essentially held in trust for Dong, prompting them to seek a charging order on the home.
The High Court, specifically Chief Master Marsh, ruled that Dong retained a beneficial interest in the home under the presumed resulting trust. This was in contradiction to the argument put forth by Dong's counsel, who contended that Section 60(3) of the LPA 1925 had abolished the presumed resulting trust.
The court clarified that the presumption of resulting trust is not abolished by Section 60(3) of the LPA 1925. Rather, the purpose of this section is to eliminate a technical requirement regarding specific language in conveyances. In essence, Section 60(3) streamlines the conveyancing process but does not eliminate the underlying presumption of resulting trust.
The court provided justification for its interpretation by emphasising that if the intention of the legislator was to abolish the longstanding presumed resulting trust, it would have been explicitly stated in clear terms within the Act. Furthermore, the court argued that there is no reasonable basis to abolish the presumption for land while retaining it for chattels, considering that the value of an interest in land conveyed without consideration might be significantly less than that of certain types of chattels.
The case is notable for its interpretation of Section 60(3) of the LPA 1925, asserting that the presumed resulting trust remains intact despite the changes introduced by this section. The decision in National Crime Agency v Dong stands in contrast to the literal interpretation in the prior case of Lohia v Lohia [2001], where it was argued that Section 60(3) had abolished the presumed resulting trust. This case underscores the importance of considering legislative intent and context in statutory interpretation.
The High Court, specifically Chief Master Marsh, ruled that Dong retained a beneficial interest in the home under the presumed resulting trust. This was in contradiction to the argument put forth by Dong's counsel, who contended that Section 60(3) of the LPA 1925 had abolished the presumed resulting trust.
The court clarified that the presumption of resulting trust is not abolished by Section 60(3) of the LPA 1925. Rather, the purpose of this section is to eliminate a technical requirement regarding specific language in conveyances. In essence, Section 60(3) streamlines the conveyancing process but does not eliminate the underlying presumption of resulting trust.
The court provided justification for its interpretation by emphasising that if the intention of the legislator was to abolish the longstanding presumed resulting trust, it would have been explicitly stated in clear terms within the Act. Furthermore, the court argued that there is no reasonable basis to abolish the presumption for land while retaining it for chattels, considering that the value of an interest in land conveyed without consideration might be significantly less than that of certain types of chattels.
The case is notable for its interpretation of Section 60(3) of the LPA 1925, asserting that the presumed resulting trust remains intact despite the changes introduced by this section. The decision in National Crime Agency v Dong stands in contrast to the literal interpretation in the prior case of Lohia v Lohia [2001], where it was argued that Section 60(3) had abolished the presumed resulting trust. This case underscores the importance of considering legislative intent and context in statutory interpretation.
